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 3043 
TREATING OSHA VIOLATIONS AS 
NEGLIGENCE PER SE 
Abstract: The doctrine of negligence per se, in its simplest formulation, enables 
courts to hold a defendant negligent as a matter of law when that defendant’s vio-
lation of a statute or regulation results in injury to another. Although courts wide-
ly accept negligence per se, many do not apply the doctrine when a defendant is 
alleged to have violated regulations implemented by federal agencies, such as the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). In fact, several courts 
take the position that treating a party’s violation of OSHA standards as negli-
gence per se is not only a misapplication of the doctrine, but incompatible with 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act), the federal legislation which 
established OSHA. This Note explores the rise of negligence per se as an estab-
lished doctrine of American tort law, considers the nature of OSHA standards and 
their relationship with state law, and provides a comprehensive survey of federal 
and state courts’ treatment of OSHA violations in negligence cases. Further, this 
Note argues that, given the discretionary nature of negligence per se, treating 
OSHA violations as negligence per se is wholly legitimate and altogether com-
patible with the OSH Act, contrary to the view of many courts. 
INTRODUCTION 
Negligence per se has long been a staple of the law student’s first-year 
curriculum.1 Ordinarily, to prove liability in a typical negligence case, a plain-
tiff must first establish that a defendant violated the applicable standard of 
care—in other words, that the defendant failed to act as a reasonably prudent 
person would under the same or similar circumstances.2 This flexible inquiry 
enables the finder of fact to engage in a far-reaching analysis, weighing nu-
merous factors in determining whether a defendant failed to act prudently on a 
particular occasion.3 The doctrine of negligence per se, by contrast, simplifies 
this ordinary negligence analysis by allowing a plaintiff to establish a defend-
ant’s departure from the applicable standard of care merely by demonstrating 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom as Biography and Intellectual His-
tory, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 590 (discussing legendary torts maestro William Prosser’s lectures on 
negligence per se in his 1938–1939 torts course at the University of Minnesota Law School). 
 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Reasonableness in and Out of Negligence Law, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. 2131, 2134 (2015) 
(discussing the “reasonable person” standard). 
 3 Thomas C. Galligan Jr., A Primer on the Patterns of Negligence, 53 LA. L. REV. 1509, 1522, 
1525 (1993). 
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that such defendant violated a statute.4 The conventional rationale for such a 
doctrine, as Professor Ezra Ripley Thayer so emphatically asserted over a cen-
tury ago, is that prudent people do not contravene the expressed intent of the 
legislature.5 
Courts have long disagreed about the degree to which they should apply 
negligence per se in tort actions.6 In the vast majority of states,7 violations of 
statute, if the statute was designed to prevent the sort of harm that occurred and 
protect the class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member, may furnish 
conclusive evidence of negligence.8 In a number of other states, even if a de-
fendant violated a statute designed both to prevent the resultant harm and to 
protect the type of plaintiff involved, a court will treat such violation as a pre-
sumption of negligence,9 or, in some cases, as merely “some” evidence of neg-
                                                                                                                           
 4 See id. at 1525 (discussing the innovation of the “duty-risk” approach and its superiority over 
earlier common law formulas for negligence). In practice, however, the analysis is more complicated 
because the plaintiff must also prove what some scholars have referred to as “limiting liability condi-
tions”: typically, that the plaintiff falls within the class of persons protected by the statute and that the 
injury is of the type that the statute was intended to prevent. See Ariel Porat, Expanding Liability for 
Negligence Per Se, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 979, 979 (2009) (arguing for a diminished role for such 
“limiting liability conditions” in assessing tort liability). Further, as the average first-year law student 
knows, negligence per se is not liability per se. See id. In other words, although statutory violations 
may sometimes be conclusive evidence of breach of duty, they cannot themselves establish causation 
or harm, which are the other necessary elements of a valid negligence action. See Martin v. Herzog, 
126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y. 1920), superseded by statute, 1975 N.Y. Laws 94, as recognized in Barker v. 
Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39, 41 (N.Y. 1984) (“We must be on our guard, however, against confusing the 
question of negligence with that of the causal connection between the negligence and the injury.”). 
 5 Ezra R. Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317, 321–22 (1914). Some 
scholars have argued that this premise is dubious, contending not only that expressed legislative intent 
can be difficult or impossible to discern, but also that the legislature never intends to impose tort lia-
bility unless it expressly says so. See Barry L. Johnson, Why Negligence Per Se Should Be Aban-
doned, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 271 (2017) (discussing criticisms of negligence per se 
rooted in public choice theory and textualism). 
 6 See infra notes 126–189 and accompanying text. As Professor Paul Yowell notes, the “presump-
tion of negligence” and “some evidence of negligence” alternatives have been considered “types of 
negligence per se.” See Paul Yowell, Judicial Discretion in Adopting Legislative Standards: Texas’s 
Solution to the Problem of Negligence Per Se?, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 109, 111 (1997) (emphasis omit-
ted) (distinguishing these variants from “true” negligence per se); see also Paul Sherman, Use of Fed-
eral Statutes in State Negligence Per Se Actions, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 831, 878–80 (1992) (referring 
to the “presumption of negligence” and “some evidence of negligence” alternatives as “distinct ap-
proaches” to negligence per se). Accordingly, this Note refers to the conventional form of the doctrine 
that treats a defendant’s statutory violation as dispositive of the issue of breach of duty as “pure” neg-
ligence per se and other variants as “types” of negligence per se. See infra notes 25–218 and accom-
panying text. 
 7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 report-
ers’ note on cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2005, amended 2016) (observing that negligence per se is the 
“strong majority rule” in American jurisdictions).  
 8 See, e.g., Parker Bldg. Servs. Co. v. Lightsey, 925 So. 2d 927, 931 (Ala. 2005) (holding that 
proof of a violation of statute is proof of breach of duty). 
 9 See, e.g., Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 581 N.E.2d 656, 661 (Ill. 1991) (holding that viola-
tions of statute constitute “prima facie” negligence (emphasis omitted)); Vandergrift v. Johnson, 206 
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ligence.10 Indeed, several states apply negligence per se in a different manner 
for different types of statutes.11 Although these disagreements have existed 
nearly as long as the doctrine itself, they have only grown more pronounced 
following the surge of statutes and regulations in the second half of the twenti-
eth century.12 One significant and little-discussed area of difference in courts’ 
application of negligence per se, which this Note takes as its subject, concerns 
tort actions arising from violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSH Act).13 
Enacted by Congress in 1970 to curb a perceived epidemic of workplace 
accidents, the OSH Act established a new federal agency within the Depart-
ment of Labor known as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA).14 As the OSH Act declares, the basic function of OSHA is to develop 
and enforce federal safety and health standards in the workplace.15 Since its 
inception, OSHA has promulgated numerous workplace standards, both “hori-
zontal” (applying across industries) and “vertical” (applying to single indus-
tries only), violations of which are punishable by a range of monetary penal-
ties.16 Although courts unanimously agree that OSHA standards do not create a 
                                                                                                                           
S.E.2d 515, 517 (W. Va. 1974) (distinguishing “prima facie” negligence from “negligence per se” 
(emphasis omitted)); see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(a)(1) (Deering 2019) (“The failure of a person 
to exercise due care is presumed if . . . [h]e violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public 
entity . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 10 See, e.g., Horstmeyer v. Golden Eagle Fireworks, 534 N.W.2d 835, 838 (N.D. 1995) (holding 
that violation of a statute, if the plaintiff establishes a causal connection between the violation and the 
harm, may be evidence of negligence, but is not negligence in itself); DeJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line 
R.R. Co., 281 So. 2d 198, 200–01 (Fla. 1973) (noting that, under Florida law, violation of traffic stat-
utes is some evidence of negligence, but not pure negligence per se). 
 11 See, e.g., DeJesus, 281 So. 2d at 200–01; Elliott v. City of New York, 747 N.E.2d 760, 762 
(N.Y. 2001) (noting that, under New York law, violations of state statutes may be negligence per se, 
whereas violations of local ordinances are merely some evidence of negligence). 
 12 See Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law in the Age of Statutes, 99 IOWA L. REV. 957, 960 (2014) (ob-
serving that the rise of statutory law in the latter part of the twentieth century has created considerable 
controversy around the doctrine of negligence per se). Indeed, in the famous words of Judge Guido 
Calabresi, modern American law finds itself “[c]hoking on [s]tatutes.” GUIDO CALABRESI, A COM-
MON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982). 
 13 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590, 1590–1620 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–675, 677, 678 (2018)). 
 14 Walter Jr. Jensen, Jr., Coenraad L. Mohr & Duke N. Stern, Administration of the OSH Act in 
the Face of Criticism from Industry and Labor, 11 AM. BUS. L.J. 37, 37–39 (1973). At the time of its 
enactment, the amount of work-related injuries resulting in disability per one million worker hours in 
the U.S. was twenty percent higher than the rate of the previous decade, and manufacturers were in-
troducing an estimated seventy new chemicals into industry each day. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW § 1:2 (2019) (recounting Congress’s motivation for enact-
ing the OSH Act). 
 15 84 Stat. at 1590 (“An Act [t]o assure safe and healthful working conditions for working men 
and women; by authorizing enforcement of the standards developed under the Act . . . .”). 
 16 Jensen, Mohr & Stern, supra note 14, at 39. 
3046 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:3043 
private right of action,17 they have reached different conclusions about whether 
such standards may establish the applicable standard of care when a plaintiff 
alleges he or she was injured at work due to another’s negligence.18 In other 
words, they disagree about whether violations of OSHA standards should be 
treated as negligence per se.19 
This Note examines of the foundations of negligence per se and surveys 
the ways in which courts apply it in OSHA-related tort actions, ultimately pre-
senting an argument in favor of a more liberal application of the doctrine in 
such cases.20 Part I reviews the history and rationale of negligence per se.21 
Part II examines the nature of OSHA standards and their connection with state 
law.22 Part III discusses the different positions adopted by both the federal ap-
peals courts and the state courts of last resort concerning the relationship be-
tween a party’s alleged violation of OSHA standards and that party’s liability 
in tort.23 Finally, Part IV argues that, contrary to the view of many courts and 
commentators, treating violations of OSHA standards as negligence per se is 
purely a matter of judicial discretion and altogether compatible with both the 
nature of the doctrine and the purpose of OSHA.24 
I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF NEGLIGENCE PER SE 
Before considering the nature of OSHA standards and surveying the ways 
courts have treated a party’s violation of such standards in negligence cases, it 
is necessary to thoroughly examine the foundations of negligence per se.25 As 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See Clark v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 669 F. App’x 362, 363 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing 29 U.S.C. 
§ 653(b)(4)) (affirming dismissal of cause of action based on alleged OSHA violations); Pratico v. 
Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 265 (1st Cir. 1985) (recognizing negligence per se for OSHA 
violations alleged in action under the Federal Employers Liability Act); Minichello v. U.S. Indus., 
Inc., 756 F.2d 26, 29 (6th Cir. 1985) (rejecting negligence per se theory of recovery based on OSHA 
violation in products liability case); Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co., 507 F.2d 973, 977 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(holding that the OSH Act’s provisions for enforcement render a private cause of action based on 
OSHA violations unnecessary to effectuate the legislation’s intent); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, 
§ 21:13 (noting that it is “firmly established” among courts that the OSH Act does not create a private 
cause of action). 
 18 See infra notes 126–189 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 126–189 and accompanying text. There is, however, near unanimous agreement 
among the states that testimonial or documentary evidence of an employer’s OSHA violations is in-
admissible at trial, because such evidence is either irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, or hearsay. See 
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 21:13 (surveying state approaches). Only Alabama permits admissions 
of this sort. See Wyser v. Ray Sumlin Constr. Co., 680 So. 2d 235, 238 (Ala. 1996) (holding that 
OSHA report detailing various citations employer received was admissible to show employer’s 
knowledge of non-compliant workplace). 
 20 See infra notes 25–218 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 25–75 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 76–125 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 126–189 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 190–217 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 26–75 and accompanying text. 
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commentators have observed, there is a relatively scarce amount of scholarship 
concerning the theoretical foundations of the doctrine.26 Nevertheless, the 
emergence and development of negligence per se in nineteenth-century Ameri-
can law is well-documented,27 and courts and scholars since that time have 
occasionally attempted to articulate its proper justification.28 Section A of this 
Part outlines the origins and development of negligence per se in the United 
States.29 Section B discusses the conventional rationale for the doctrine, fa-
mously articulated by Ezra Ripley Thayer, as well as the extent to which this 
rationale retains currency among today’s courts and legal commentators.30 
A. The Origins and Development of the Doctrine 
The origins of negligence per se in American law date to the second half 
of the nineteenth century, when rapid industrialization brought with it an un-
precedented surge of work-related personal injury suits.31 Perhaps the first use 
of the doctrine by a state’s high court was in 1866 when the New York Court 
of Appeals decided Ernst v. Hudson River Railroad Co.32 In Ernst, the court 
held that a defendant’s violation of a state safety statute, which required trains 
to sound their whistle and bells at specified railroad junctions, rendered that 
defendant liable for the death of a teamster who was struck by the defendant’s 
locomotive.33 Judge John Kilham Porter’s vehement declaration that “[i]t is not 
the policy of the law to favor those who deliberately violate its mandates” cap-
tured the novel idea that contravening legislatively enacted safety standards 
could conclusively establish a defendant’s breach of duty in a negligence ac-
tion brought by a private plaintiff.34 In the decades following Ernst, many 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See, e.g., 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 319 (2001) (“The history of the negligence per 
se rule seems not to have been written . . . .”); Robert F. Blomquist, The Trouble with Negligence Per 
Se, 61 S.C. L. REV. 221, 224 n.11 (2009) (“No scholar to date has exhaustively examined, on an in-
depth basis, the origins and legal theory of negligence per se.”). 
 27 See Blomquist, supra note 26, at 225–43 (discussing early American case law deriving negli-
gence principles from violations of statute); Johnson, supra note 5, at 258–62 (reviewing the origins 
of negligence per se). 
 28 See, e.g., Porat, supra note 4, at 980; Thayer, supra note 5, at 321–22. 
 29 See infra notes 31–57 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 58–75 and accompanying text. 
 31 Yowell, supra note 6, at 110. Negligence per se emerged in Great Britain roughly around the 
same period. See Gorris v. Scott [1874] 9 L.R. Exch. at 125 (Eng.) (establishing that, for a defendant’s 
statutory violation to constitute a breach of duty, the harm to the plaintiff must be of the sort that the 
statute was intended to prevent). 
 32 Ernst v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 9, 28–29 (1866). 
 33 Id. The court also noted that the defendant failed to observe the custom (not legally required) of 
waving a flag when a locomotive was approaching a crossing. Id. at 28. 
 34 Id. at 28–29; Blomquist, supra note 26, at 229 n.45. This is not to say, however, that courts had 
not previously recognized liability when defendants violated statutes that expressly provided civil 
liability for the noncompliant. See, e.g., Langlois v. Buffalo & Rochester R.R. Co., 19 Barb. 364, 370 
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judges began utilizing the principles of negligence per se in their opinions, al-
beit not always in the same manner as the Ernst court.35 By 1913, even the 
United States Supreme Court, in St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway 
Co. v. McWhirter, addressed the fledgling tort doctrine, reversing an aggressive 
state court decision that held a defendant-railroad negligent for its violation of 
a federal law restricting the length of its employees’ shifts.36 Although the Su-
preme Court’s ruling did not endorse the application of the doctrine to the par-
ticular facts of the case, it also did not reject, in general, the use of a federal 
statutory violation to find that a defendant acted negligently.37 
Less than a decade after McWhirter, the New York Court of Appeals, the 
same court that gave birth to the doctrine half a century earlier, decided Martin 
v. Herzog, a case that would produce the seminal opinion on negligence per 
se.38 In Martin, the court held that a plaintiff’s failure to signal with her lights 
while travelling by buggy on a public way, as required by state statute, ren-
dered her contributorily negligent with regard to the resultant collision.39 The 
then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo famously announced that the plaintiff’s “unex-
cused omission of the statutory signals is more than some evidence of negli-
gence. It is negligence in itself.”40 A highly influential opinion, Martin helped 
elevate negligence per se to even greater prominence among United States 
courts and legal academics.41 
                                                                                                                           
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1854) (noting that a violation of statute requiring fences to be built along railroads 
would have constituted a breach of duty if the legislature had expressly provided so in the statute). 
 35 Blomquist, supra note 26, at 231. Many early courts used the phrase not to denote negligence 
resulting from statutory violations, but rather to denote negligence resulting from the breach of certain 
duties considered so important as to be outside the province of the jury. See, e.g., Ohio & Miss. R.R. 
Co. v. Shanefelt, 47 Ill. 497, 500 (1868) (“In that case, as in this, it was contended, that it was negli-
gence per se to permit dry weeds and grass to accumulate on the right of way of a railway company; 
that its presence there created a legal presumption of negligence.”); Pa. R.R. Co. v. Beale, 73 Pa. 504, 
510 (1873) (holding that failure to stop before crossing a railroad track was “not merely evidence of 
negligence for the jury, but negligence per se, and a question for the court”). 
 36 229 U.S. 265, 281 (1913). The federal law at issue was the Hours of Service Act of 1907. See 
Hours of Service Act, ch. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415 (1907). 
 37 See McWhirter, 229 U.S. at 280 (“[W]e think that where no such liability is expressed in the 
statute it cannot be supplied by implication. It requires no reasoning to demonstrate that the general 
rule is that where negligence is charged, to justify a recovery it must be shown that the alleged negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the damage.”). Thus, the Court suggested that, had proximate causa-
tion between the statutory violation and the injury been shown, they would have upheld the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals’ negligence per se analysis. See Blomquist, supra note 26, at 243. 
 38 Martin, 126 N.E. at 815. 
 39 See id. (observing that the plaintiff “f[e]ll short of the standard of diligence to which those who 
live in organized society are under a duty to conform”). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Blomquist, supra note 26, at 252. Between the time Martin was decided and the end of the 
twentieth century, more than 10,000 federal and state court opinions utilized, or at least mentioned, 
the principles of negligence per se. Id. (citing Westlaw search of U.S. cases between 1920 and 2000). 
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In 1934, negligence per se became codified42 when the American Law In-
stitute published its Restatement (First) of Torts (First Restatement).43 The 
First Restatement provided that the violation of a statute or other legislative 
enactment would constitute a breach of a duty when: (a) the intent of the stat-
ute was to protect the plaintiff’s interests; (b) the violation was the factual 
cause of the invasion of particular interests that the statute was designed to 
protect; (c) the statute was one designed to protect against a certain hazard, and 
the invasion of interests resulted from that hazard; and (d) the violation was the 
proximate cause of the invasion, and the plaintiff was not contributorily negli-
gent.44 Thus, by tying the doctrine to legislative intent, the First Restatement 
considerably limited the scope of negligence per se, at least compared to the 
liberal application of the doctrine by many earlier courts.45 This formulation of 
negligence per se remained generally intact in the 1965 Restatement (Second) 
of Torts (Second Restatement), which, in a slight departure from the First Re-
statement, emphasized that deriving the appropriate standard of care in a neg-
ligence case from a particular legislative enactment is entirely a matter of dis-
cretion for the trial court.46 Half a century after that, despite restrictions on the 
use of negligence per se imposed by some state legislatures amid the “tort re-
form” furor of the 1980’s,47 the Restatement (Third) of Torts (Third Restate-
                                                                                                                           
 42 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 286 (AM. LAW INST. 1934, amended 1939). Given that 
they do not have the force of law, the American Law Institute’s Restatements may be termed private 
codifications. See Deborah A. DeMott, Restatements and Non-State Codifications of Private Law, in 
CODIFICATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 2ND IACL THEMATIC 
CONFERENCE 75 (Wen-Yeu Wang ed., 2014). Other scholars have also observed that the Restate-
ments’ form and purpose resemble traditional legal codes. Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: 
The Restatements and the Common Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205, 226–27 n.116 (2007) (explaining that, 
although the American Law Institute did not originally wish that the Restatements be considered 
codes, it allowed for the possibility that they would acquire “quasi statutory sanction”). 
 43 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 286. Although persuasive authority, Restatements, which 
purport to merely describe the common law, are not binding unless officially adopted by a jurisdic-
tion’s highest court. Restatement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 44 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 286. 
 45 See Barbara Kritchevsky, Tort Law Is State Law: Why Courts Should Distinguish State and 
Federal Law in Negligence-Per-Se Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 71, 81 (2010) (discussing early 
development of negligence per se). 
 46 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. d (“The decision to adopt the standard is 
purely a judicial one, for the court to make. When the court does adopt the legislative standard, it is 
acting to further the general purpose which it finds in the legislation, and not because it is in any way 
required to do so.”). 
 47 See Nancy L. Manzer, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on 
Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 628 (1988). In 
1986 alone, more than three-fifths of the states enacted some form of tort reform legislation. Id. In 
some states, such legislation limited the discretion of courts’ application of negligence per se. See, 
e.g., 1986 Wash. Legis. Serv. 1365 (West) (limiting pure negligence per se to violations of statutes 
regulating electrical fire safety, the use of smoke alarms, or driving while under the influence). 
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ment) retained largely the same formula as its predecessors and noted that the 
doctrine remains popular among American courts.48 
Although the basic outline of negligence per se by the Restatements 
looks, by and large, the same from the time of the First to that of the Third, 
some differences warrant mention.49 Notably, unlike the First, the Second Re-
statement indicated that courts may apply negligence per se principles not only 
to violations of legislative enactments, but also to violations of administrative 
regulations.50 Such an acknowledgement was perhaps more prescriptive than 
descriptive; even though state courts had been applying negligence per se prin-
ciples to violations of federal statutes since the earliest days of the doctrine,51 
the same practice with respect to federal administrative regulations was not as 
widespread when work began on the Second Restatement in the early 1950s.52 
But considering the relative scarcity, by today’s standards, of federal adminis-
trative regulations prior to the mid-1900s, this is hardly surprising.53 What is 
surprising, however, is that even today, amidst the “era of big regulation,”54 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 (“An actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor 
violates a statute that is designed to protect against the type of accident the actor’s conduct causes, and 
if the accident victim is within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect.”). 
 49 See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text (describing the Restatement’s evolution); infra 
notes 50–57 and accompanying text. 
 50 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. d; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 286. The 
Third Restatement acknowledges the same. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. a (“This 
Section most frequently applies to statutes adopted by state legislatures, but equally applies to . . . 
regulations promulgated by federal agencies.”). Even the Supreme Court has recently declared that the 
“violation of federal statutes and regulations is commonly given negligence-per-se effect in state tort 
proceedings.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 318 (2005) 
(emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. a). 
 51 See Kritchevsky, supra note 45, at 91 (discussing state decisions in the late nineteenth century 
that held that violations of federal industrial safety statutes were negligence per se). Professor 
Kritchevsky notes that the practice by state courts of giving negligence per se effect to violations of 
federal statutes continues to be commonplace today. See id. at 73. The Third Restatement expressly 
acknowledges this as well. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. a; see Grable & Sons Metal 
Prods., 545 U.S. at 318. 
 52 See Clarence Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence Actions, 28 
TEX. L. REV. 143, 145 (1949). This is not to say, however, that the treatment of violations of federal 
agency regulations as negligence per se by state courts was unheard of prior to the Second Restate-
ment. See Kritchevsky, supra note 45, at 91–92 (discussing early negligence per se cases). For exam-
ple, in Rinehart v. Woodford Flying Services, Inc., the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held 
that a federal aircraft safety regulation supplied the applicable standard of care in a negligence action. 
9 S.E.2d 521, 522–23 (W. Va. 1940); see also Pa. R.R. Co. v. Moses, 182 N.E. 40, 42 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1931) (holding that violation of the orders of the federal Interstate Commerce Commission, specifying 
equipment for locomotives, constituted negligence per se in a state tort action). 
 53 See Johnson, supra note 5, at 268 (stating that Congress alone has created “twelve times the 
statutory law during the last fifty years” than during the previous 150 years). 
 54 Jeff Jacoby, Opinion, Will the Era of Big Regulation Ever Be Over?, BOS. GLOBE (May 10, 
2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/05/10/will-era-big-regulation-ever over/jNiPMgc
UvniGgxN62AeRDM/story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20201011015714/https://www.boston
globe.com/opinion/2016/05/10/will-era-big-regulation-ever-over/jNiPMgcUvniGgxN62AeRDM/st
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relatively few courts in the United States have come to treat violations of agency 
rules the same as statutory violations in tort actions, notwithstanding the Ameri-
can Law Institute’s recognition and implicit endorsement of the practice.55 
Moreover, even those jurisdictions that do apply negligence per se to administra-
tive rule violations do not do so in the same manner for every type of regula-
tion.56 Accordingly, the relationship—both normative and descriptive—between 
administrative regulations, such as OSHA standards, and the applicable standard 
of care in negligence cases, remains considerably opaque.57 
B. The Justifications for the Doctrine: Then and Now 
In its earliest days in the United States, the leading rationale behind negli-
gence per se was the simple premise that reasonably prudent people do not vio-
late what the legislature has pronounced to be a standard of proper conduct.58 
Without a doctrine of negligence per se, courts feared, a defendant would be 
“permitted to violate the law with impunity, provided the jury f[ou]nd it to have 
been carefully done.”59 In his seminal 1914 article, Public Wrong and Private 
Action, Ezra Ripley Thayer further elaborated upon this traditional rationale, 
arguing that the reasonably prudent person could never violate the public law.60 
Such a person would inevitably fall into self-contradiction, said Thayer, given 
that the public law is itself authored by and for reasonably prudent people.61 Ac-
cording to Thayer, it would be not only absurd, but an affront to a sovereign’s 
lawmaking authority, for a jury to find that a defendant’s personal judgment 
                                                                                                                           
ory.html] (lamenting that if “federal regulation” were a country, it would boast the ninth-largest econ-
omy on earth). 
 55 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW § 22.07 (3d ed. 2010). 
 56 See id.; infra notes 126–189 and accompanying text. 
 57 See infra notes 126–189 and accompanying text. 
 58 See Grey’s Ex’r v. Mobile Trade Co., 55 Ala. 387, 403 (1876) (“[E]very person, while violat-
ing an express statute, is a wrongdoer, and, as such, is, ex necessitate, negligent in the eye of the law 
. . . .”). This has been referred to as the “outlaw” theory of negligence per se. See Fleming James Jr., 
Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REV. 95, 104–05 (1950). 
 59 Smith v. Mine & Smelter Supply Co., 88 P. 683, 683, 686 (Utah 1907) (affirming a judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff when the defendant violated statutes restricting the possession of substances 
“having an explosive power greater than that of ordinary gunpowder”). 
 60 See Thayer, supra note 5, at 324–26. 
 61 See id. In Thayer’s words, 
It is an unjust reproach to our old friend the ordinary prudent man to suppose that he 
would [violate an] ordinance. It would mean changing his nature, and giving over the 
very traits which brought him into existence. And when by so doing he caused the very 
harm which the ordinance aimed to prevent, he would be the first to admit that he 
should break the ordinance at his peril. 
Id. at 326. Thayer did, however, distinguish between statutes prohibiting malfeasance and those pro-
hibiting nonfeasance, maintaining that negligence per se should only apply to violations of the former. 
See id. at 329. 
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concerning proper behavior superseded the legislature’s judgment, particularly 
when the defendant’s conduct caused injury.62 Despite early criticism that he had 
too greatly diminished the deliberative role of the jury in assessing whether a 
defendant acted properly,63 Thayer’s justification for the doctrine proved highly 
influential among courts throughout the twentieth century.64 
Despite the dominance of Thayer’s analysis, courts and commentators 
have also emphasized other rationales for negligence per se in the century 
since Public Wrong and Private Action was first published.65 For example, 
Professors William Prosser and W. Page Keeton maintained that the rationale 
behind the doctrine is principally to effectuate legislative policy.66 Thus, in 
their view, violations of laws intended only to protect the interest of the com-
munity at large—as opposed to the interests of specific persons within the 
community—should not be treated as negligence per se because doing so 
would not further such laws’ legislative purposes.67 Accordingly, unlike 
Thayer’s justification, which rooted the doctrine in the sheer unreasonableness 
of violating the law, Prosser and Keeton’s justification concentrated on the 
specific intent of the legislature in enacting particular laws.68 In addition, oth-
ers have emphasized the superior predictive power as compared to the reason-
able person standard,69 the need to equalize the administration of negligence 
and contributory negligence,70 and the importance of exact and uniform ob-
                                                                                                                           
 62 Id. at 323. 
 63 See, e.g., Charles L.B. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. 
REV. 361, 368 (1932) (“Underlying Thayer’s whole article is the tacit premise that the court defines 
what a reasonably prudent man would or would not do, and the jury says that this is what the defend-
ant has or has not done. This is manifestly not so.”). 
 64 See, e.g., Toll Bros. v. Considine, 706 A.2d 493, 495 (Del. 1998) (discussing Thayer) (“It has 
long been recognized that a legislative body may substitute its enactments for the general negligence 
standard of conduct required of a reasonable person.”); Structural Metals, Inc. v. Impson, 469 S.W.2d 
261, 266, 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (discussing Thayer when holding that the application of negli-
gence per se was consistent with the doctrine’s “legal justification”), rev’d, 487 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 
1972). 
 65 See James, supra note 58, at 107 (discussing proffered rationales for negligence per se). 
 66 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 (5th ed. 1984); see 
also Bittle v. Brunetti, 750 P.2d 49, 57 (Colo. 1988) (discussing Prosser and Keeton’s theory of negli-
gence per se). 
 67 KEETON ET AL., supra note 66, § 36. 
 68 See id. As Part I mentions, the notion that legislative intent should guide the applicability and 
scope of negligence per se has become widely accepted. See Yowell, supra note 6, at 118 (arguing 
that courts created negligence per se to adhere to legislative will); supra notes 25–75 and accompany-
ing text. 
 69 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. c (“When each jury makes up its own mind as 
to the negligence of . . . conduct, there are serious disadvantages in terms of inequality, high litigation 
costs, and failing to provide clear guidance to persons engaged in primary activity . . . . Negligence per 
se hence replaces decisionmaking by juries in categories of cases where the operation of the latter may 
be least satisfactory.”). 
 70 See James, supra note 58, at 107. 
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servance of certain public safety regulations as alternative justifications for the 
doctrine of negligence per se.71 
Insofar as the doctrine’s treatment in the Third Restatement represents the 
leading rationale for negligence per se today, it appears that the traditional 
Thayerian justification maintains considerable currency.72 The Third Restate-
ment cites “institutional comity” as the doctrine’s animating rationale, asserting 
that the judiciary should not come to conclusions incompatible with those of the 
legislature concerning the reasonableness of certain conduct.73 Thus, much like 
Thayer, the Third Restatement insists that the legislature’s determination with 
respect to reasonable conduct must supersede that of a jury, lest the authority of 
the legislature be rendered illusory.74 Nonetheless, much like Prosser and Keet-
on, the Third Restatement also emphasizes the centrality of specific legislative 
intent, stating that the purpose of negligence per se is to further a state’s legisla-
tive judgment about which conduct is acceptable in a given situation.75 
II. OSHA AND THE NATURE OF ITS STANDARDS 
Just a few years after the American Law Institute affirmed the legitimacy 
of negligence per se in the Second Restatement, Congress published a signifi-
cant legal document of its own: the OSH Act.76 This legislation established 
OSHA, the federal agency tasked with developing and implementing work-
place safety guidelines, commonly known as OSHA standards.77 Understand-
ing the nature of these standards—the manner in which they are implemented 
and enforced, what legal force they command, and the actors they bind—is 
essential to a proper examination of their relationship with the applicable 
standard of care in OSHA-related tort cases and the doctrine of negligence per 
se.78 Accordingly, this Part sketches a brief overview of the nature of OSHA 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See Clinkscales v. Carver, 136 P.2d 777, 778 (Cal. 1943) (holding that violation of traffic law 
constituted negligence per se “whether or not the driver is immune from criminal prosecution because 
of some irregularity in the erection of the stop-sign”). 
 72 Barbara Kritchevsky, Whose Idea Was It? Why Violations of State Laws Enacted Pursuant to 
Federal Mandates Should Not Be Negligence Per Se, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 693, 704 (stating that the 
Third Restatement’s rationale for negligence per se is the “[c]urrent [j]ustification” for the doctrine).  
 73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. c (noting that it would be “awkward” for a court to 
consider reasonable that which the legislature has implicitly decreed unreasonable). 
 74 See id. (“[W]hen the legislature has addressed the issue of what conduct is appropriate, the 
judgment of the legislature, as the authoritative representative of the community, takes precedence 
over the views of any one jury.”). 
 75 See id.; Kritchevsky, supra note 72, at 704–05 (maintaining that the Third Restatement empha-
sizes the furtherance of legislative intent as the primary rationale of negligence per se). 
 76 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590, 1590–1620 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–675, 677–678 (2018)). The Act was signed into law on Decem-
ber 29, 1970, and went into effect on April 27, 1971. Id.  
 77 Jensen, Mohr & Stern, supra note 14, at 39. 
 78 See infra notes 126–189 and accompanying text. 
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and the standards it promulgates.79 Section A provides an overview of the pro-
cedures for issuing and enforcing OSHA standards, as well as a summary of 
the effect of such standards on employers and employees.80 Section B exam-
ines the intersection between federal OSHA standards and state law, a relation-
ship that courts in OSHA-related negligence per se cases often discuss.81 
A. The Issuance, Enforcement, and Scope of Standards Under the OSH Act 
Intended by Congress to stem a perceived epidemic of workplace injuries 
and deaths, the OSH Act assigns to OSHA two principal functions: first, set-
ting standards promulgated by the United States Secretary of Labor, and sec-
ond, conducting workplace inspections to ensure that employers are complying 
with those standards.82 Section 6(b) of the Act describes the procedures for 
modifying, nullifying, or issuing new OSHA standards.83 In general, the prom-
ulgation of OSHA standards begins when the Secretary of Labor submits pro-
posals to an advisory committee, which then recommends that the proposed 
standard be adopted, rejected, or modified.84 After the advisory committee rec-
ommends a rule, the Secretary of Labor publishes the proposed rule in the 
Federal Register, thereby inviting public comment.85 Thereafter, the Secretary 
of Labor makes a final determination as to whether to promulgate the stand-
ard.86 If a proposed standard is adopted, it is not necessary that the final form 
of the standard be republished in the Federal Register.87 
Critically, the OSH Act grants authority to the Secretary of Labor and 
OSHA to promulgate both “standards” and “regulations,” and the two terms 
are not interchangeable.88 Courts have held that “standards” under the Act are 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See infra notes 82–125 and accompanying text. 
 80 See infra notes 82–107 and accompanying text. 
 81 See infra notes 108–125 and accompanying text. 
 82 See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text (providing overview of OSH Act’s enactment 
and OSHA’s authority). 
 83 See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1) (2018). 
 84 Id. 
 85 See id. All “interested person[s]” may also request a public hearing during this period. Id. 
 86 Id. The Secretary of Labor may subvert the ordinary promulgation procedures by adopting an 
emergency temporary standard upon their determination that employees are imminently at risk of 
“grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or 
from new hazards.” 29 U.S.C. § 655(c). Such emergency temporary standards may only remain in 
effect for six months. Id. 
 87 See Edison Elec. Inst. v. OSHA, 849 F.2d 611, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding that the revised 
OSHA standard, which was not republished, did not cover employers any differently than the original 
standard and that the petitioner incorrectly assumed the original standard excluded certain workplace 
wiring requirements that were made explicit in the revised standard). 
 88 See Steel Erectors Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. OSHA, 636 F.3d 107, 113–15 (4th Cir. 2011) (reject-
ing immediate appellate review on the basis that challenged OSHA rule was a “rule,” not a “stand-
ard”); La. Chem. Ass’n v. Bingham, 657 F.2d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1981) (defining OSHA “standards” 
as “remedial measure[s] addressed to a specific and already identified hazard” and “regulations” as 
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remedial measures adopted to address specified hazards, whereas “regulations” 
are administrative efforts designed to enforce compliance with the standards.89 
This terminological distinction is important, as it has significant implications 
for the type of judicial review that an aggrieved party may obtain.90 As section 
6(f) of the OSH Act provides, any party who alleges adverse impact by a 
promulgated standard may petition a federal appellate court in which the party 
resides for pre-enforcement review within sixty days of promulgation.91 Re-
viewing courts typically apply the “substantial evidence” test to a challenged 
standard, asking whether sufficient explanation supported OSHA’s rejection of 
public objection to a proposed standard.92 Section 8(g) of the Act, on the other 
hand, which authorizes OSHA to promulgate “rules and regulations,” does not 
provide for similar judicial review.93 Thus, courts have held that a party chal-
lenging a promulgated regulation cannot receive immediate appellate review 
and must instead initiate administrative proceedings.94 
All enforcement functions authorized by the OSH Act rest with OSHA.95 
One of the principal enforcement functions authorized by the Act is the power 
of OSHA compliance officers to inspect the workplaces of covered employ-
ers.96 During any such inspection, every employer has the right to be present 
and accompany an OSHA compliance officer.97 Once an inspection concludes, 
a conference is held between the compliance officer and a representative of the 
                                                                                                                           
“purely administrative effort[s] designed to uncover violations of the [OSH] Act and discover un-
known dangers”). 
 89 See La. Chem. Ass’n, 657 F.2d at 782–84 (holding that an OSHA rule requiring employers to 
make available to employees and OSHA representatives any internal records concerning chemical 
exposure was a regulation, not a standard, because it did not function to ameliorate a “particular or 
significant” hazard). 
 90 Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 208, 211–12 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(affirming jurisdiction on the basis that challenged OSHA rule was a “standard,” as the rule imposed 
new safety obligations on employers to adopt a “comprehensive safety and health program” more 
demanding than existing OSHA safety requirements); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 4:31. 
 91 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 4:31. 
 92 See, e.g., N. Am.’s Bldg. Trades Unions v. OSHA, 878 F.3d 271, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (up-
holding an OSHA rule concerning workplace exposure to silica, despite evidence suggesting silica-
related deaths were declining rapidly in the absence of any rule, on the basis that OSHA provided 
ample explanation for finding such evidence flawed); Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 350, 354 (2d Cir. 1973) (vacating an OSHA rule concerning required 
number of lavatories at a work site on the basis that the Department of Labor failed to provide any 
“reasoned explanation” for such a rule). 
 93 Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d at 209–11. 
 94 See id. 
 95 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 1:4. 
 96 Id. For discussion of covered employers, see infra notes 101–103 and accompanying text. 
 97 29 U.S.C. § 657(e). 
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employer, after which the compliance officer may request approval to issue a 
citation from an OSHA area director.98 
The scope of OSHA’s jurisdiction is vast.99 OSHA standards bind em-
ployers in every state, the District of Columbia, and all United States territo-
ries.100 Moreover, the Act defines “employer” in very broad terms: “a person 
engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees.”101 The Occu-
pational Safety and Health Review Commission, the quasi-judicial agency 
which adjudicates alleged OSHA violations, maintains that the term “employ-
er” is not limited to formal employment relationships.102 As such, courts often 
evaluate whether a person is an employee, as opposed to an independent con-
tractor, by applying common law agency principles—considering, primarily, 
the extent to which the subject “controls” the work.103 
Before examining the relationship between OSHA and state law, one ad-
ditional provision of the OSH Act, often at issue in negligence per se litigation, 
warrants consideration here: the general duty clause.104 This provision imposes 
on employers a residuary duty to take preventative measures against serious 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Id. In addition, OSHA must issue citations within six months following the observation of any 
violation and must describe in writing the nature of the violation and note the specific standard, regu-
lation, or other provision alleged to have been violated. See 29 U.S.C. § 658(a)–(c). 
 99 See infra notes 100–103 and accompanying text. 
 100 See Caribtow Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 493 F.2d 1064, 1066 
(1st Cir. 1974) (rejecting argument that Congress lacked authority to unilaterally enact OSHA rules 
binding upon employers in Puerto Rico). 
 101 29 U.S.C. § 652(5). The OSH Act makes clear that this definition does not encompass the 
United States itself, nor “any State or political subdivision of a State.” Id. Further, it defines “person” 
as including but not limited to “one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, 
business trusts, legal representatives, or any organized group of persons.” See id. § 652(4). According 
to OSHA’s own interpretation, “employers” under the OSH Act are effectively any persons who exer-
cise authority to direct or control labor. See Foit-Albert Assocs., Architects & Eng’rs, P.C., 17 BNA 
OSHC 1975 (No. 92-654, 1997). In Foit-Albert Associates, Architects & Engineers, P.C., for exam-
ple, the Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission found that an entity was not subject to 
certain OSHA construction standards because the company’s authority with respect to a job site was 
contractually limited to inspecting for compliance with contractual specifications. Id. at *2. The 
Commission reached this conclusion despite acknowledging that the company’s “inspection activities 
may unavoidably address safety issues and require its employees to perform some incidental physical 
labor.” Id. at *1.  
 102 See S & S Diving Co., 8 BNA OSHC 2041, *3 (No. 77-4234, 1980) (finding an employer-
employee relationship where workers and putative employer “constituted an integrated economic 
unit”). 
 103 For an illustrative example of this practice, see Absolute Roofing & Construction., Inc. v. Sec-
retary of Labor, 580 F. App’x 357, 361, 362–63 (6th Cir. 2014), in which the court considered over a 
dozen factors, including “the provision of employee benefits” and “duration of . . . relationship” in 
assessing whether a worker was an employee or an independent contractor. There, however, the court 
noted that “the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is accom-
plished” remained the overriding consideration. Id. 
 104 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). The clause provides that “[e]ach employer . . . shall furnish to each of 
his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that 
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.” Id. 
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hazards for which no specific OSHA standard applies.105 Nonetheless, courts 
have been reluctant to interpret the general duty clause as a mechanism for 
imposing strict liability on employers, typically recognizing a breach of the 
provision only when an employer fails to address “feasibly preventable” forms 
of hazardous conduct.106 Although the general duty clause creates an obligation 
for an employer to keep its “place of employment” free from recognized haz-
ards, this obligation typically does not make an employer responsible for any-
one other than its own employees.107 
B. The Relationship Between OSHA and State Law 
According to ordinary principles of federal preemption, pervasive federal 
regulatory schemes, such as that which the OSH Act establishes, bar states 
from enacting or enforcing their own supplementary laws dealing with the 
same regulatory field as the federal scheme.108 Despite being a federal agency 
with nationwide jurisdiction over workplace safety, however, OSHA does not 
preclude the states from enacting their own health and safety standards.109 To 
the contrary, the OSH Act expressly encourages and empowers states to play a 
prominent role in such regulation.110 The primary mechanism by which the 
OSH Act promotes state involvement is found in section 18, which gives states 
the option to develop and administer their own OSHA plans and thereby, in 
some sense, “preempt” federal OSHA standards.111 Many of the cases dis-
                                                                                                                           
 105 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 6:1. 
 106 See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 530 F.2d 1143, 
1145 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that an employer breached OSHA’s general duty provision when it 
failed to pressure test an oil pressure vessel that exploded soon after installation, on the basis that 
pressure treating such vessels is a universally accepted industry standard and easily carried out); 
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 6:1. 
 107 Fry’s Tank Serv., Inc., 4 BNA OSHC 1515 (Nos. 4447 & 4648, 1976) (finding that an em-
ployer did not violate general duty provision when an independent contractor died from drowning in 
an oilfield accident and the employer’s workers attempted to rescue him, as it was not foreseeable that 
employees would be exposed to hazard); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 6:1. But see Acosta v. Hensel 
Phelps Constr. Co., 909 F.3d 723, 743 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that OSHA may issue citations to 
controlling employers at multi-employer worksites pursuant to the general duty provision). 
 108 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 105 (1992) (holding that the OSH Act 
preempted state regulation of workplace safety, but only because the state failed to obtain federal 
approval of its state-administered OSHA plan). 
 109 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 3:1 (providing a broad overview of the procedures by which 
states receive federal approval for their state-administered OSHA plans). 
 110 See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(11) (stating that one of the purposes of the OSH Act is to encourage 
states to assume responsibility for workplace safety). 
 111 See id. § 667(b) (“Any State which, at any time, desires to assume responsibility for develop-
ment and enforcement therein of occupational safety and health issue with respect to which a Federal 
standard has been promulgated . . . shall submit a State plan for the development of such standards 
and their enforcement.”); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 3:1.  
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cussed in the following Part of this Note involve standards promulgated under 
such state OSHA plans.112 
In order for a state OSHA plan to receive approval from the Secretary of 
Labor, it must, among other requirements, designate or create a new state 
agency to enforce the plan, assure that this agency will have the legal authority 
and funding necessary to serve as an effective enforcement mechanism, and 
specify procedures for the promulgation of standards and regulations.113 Most 
importantly, however, the proposed state plan must be “at least as effective” at 
providing workplace safety as OSHA’s existing standards.114 To evaluate the 
comparative effectiveness of proposed state plans, OSHA uses ad hoc, process-
based criteria and “procedural indices.”115 Currently, twenty-one states, along 
with Puerto Rico, have federally-approved OSHA plans covering all employ-
ees within their state.116 
Besides its provision for optional state OSHA plans, the OSH Act inter-
acts with state law in another significant way, one which is especially salient in 
many negligence per se cases.117 This interaction comes by way of section 
4(b)(4), which expressly refers to the effect of OSHA standards on state tort 
law.118 Specifically, it provides that “[n]othing in this Act shall . . . enlarge or 
diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory rights, 
duties, or liabilities of employers and employees.”119 The primary purpose of 
this “savings clause”120 is to prevent defendant-employers from asserting dur-
                                                                                                                           
 112 See, e.g., Hottmann v. Hottmann, 572 N.W.2d 259, 263 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that 
MIOSHA standards cannot constitute evidence of the standard of care owed to a non-employee). 
 113 See 29 U.S.C. § 667(c); see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 3:4 (discussing prerequisites for 
state plan approval).  
 114 SCOTT D. SZYMENDERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43969, OSHA STATE PLANS: IN BRIEF, 
WITH EXAMPLES FROM CALIFORNIA AND ARIZONA 2 (2016). States are free to enact standards that 
are more stringent than federal OSHA standards and may establish standards governing specific haz-
ards that federal OSHA leaves unregulated. See id. at 5 (discussing California’s “unique” OSHA plan 
that includes a specific standard that applies in cases of employees working outdoors during periods of 
high temperatures).  
 115 See Courtney M. Malveaux, OSHA Enforcement of the “as Effective as” Standard for State 
Plans: Serving Process or People?, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 323, 326–29 (2011) (arguing that OSHA’s 
“at least as effective” test for state OSHA plan approval leaves the states without suitable guidance for 
creating a program that embodies the goals of the OSH Act). 
 116 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 3:10. These include Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ore-
gon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. In addition, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, New Jersey, New York, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have state OSHA 
plans that apply only to public employees. Id.  
 117 See infra notes 126–189 and accompanying text. 
 118 See 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Occupational Safety & Health Admin., Opinion Letter on the Preemption Provision in 
OSHA’s Hazard Communication Standard (Oct. 18, 2011) (maintaining that, as made clear by section 
4(b)(4), nothing in the OSH Act evinces any legislative intent to preempt state tort law). 
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ing litigation that any OSHA standard overrides or preempts an element of a 
cause of action recognized under state law.121 For example, in Jones v. Cincin-
nati, Inc., the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that, in a negligence action 
brought against a manufacturer by a worker injured by an industrial product, 
the defendant could not escape liability by relying on an OSHA standard that 
provided that assuring the safe operation of machinery in the workplace is a 
duty held solely by an employer.122 
Nonetheless, barring defendants from avoiding tort liability merely by as-
serting their compliance with OSHA standards has not been the only effect of 
section 4(b)(4).123 Courts have unanimously held that the provision also oper-
ates to bar plaintiffs from maintaining a cause of action based solely on a de-
fendant’s violation of OSHA standards.124 Accordingly, as discussed in Part III, 
this provision has significant implications for the tenability of the position that 
a defendant’s OSHA violation constitutes negligence per se.125 
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF NEGLIGENCE PER SE TO VIOLATIONS  
OF OSHA STANDARDS: A SURVEY 
Not long after the ratification of the OSH Act, tort plaintiffs injured in the 
workplace began to argue that violations of OSHA standards by defendant-
                                                                                                                           
 121 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1234–36 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding 
that OSHA standard protecting laborers from lead exposure did not “enlarge or diminish or affect” 
existing state workers’ compensation laws), amended Jan. 30, 1981. 
 122 See 589 N.E.2d 335, 339–40 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Richard C. Ausness, The Welding Fume 
Case and the Preemptive Effect of OSHA’s HazCom Standard on Common Law Failure-to-Warn 
Claims, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 133–35 (2006) (discussing Jones, 589 N.E.2d at 339–40, and other 
cases relying on section 4(b)(4) to prevent preemption of state law claims by OSHA). 
 123 See Minichello v. U.S. Indus., Inc. 756 F.2d 26, 29 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that section 
4(b)(4) of the OSH Act bars parties from maintaining a negligence per se theory premised on an 
OSHA violation); infra notes 126–189 and accompanying text. 
 124 See Ellis v. Chase Comm’cns, 63 F.3d 473, 477–78 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a theory of lia-
bility premised solely on a defendant’s violation of Tennessee OSHA standards); supra note 17 and 
accompanying text (noting the consensus among courts that the OSH Act does not create a private 
right of action based on violation of its terms); see also Jonathan L.F. Silver, National Labor Policy 
and the Conflict Between Safety and Production, 23 B.C. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (1981) (detailing Con-
gress’s justification for not creating a private right of action based on the OSH Act). To say that 
OSHA does not create a private right of action is, however, not necessarily to say that OSHA viola-
tions cannot be pure negligence per se. See, e.g., Trankel v. Dep’t of Military Affairs, 938 P.2d 614, 
625 (Mont. 1997) (holding that, although the OSH Act does not create a private right of action, OSHA 
violations can serve as the basis for a negligence per se claim). Some courts, nonetheless, have held 
that section 4(b)(4) implies both. See, e.g., Ries v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 1162 
(3d Cir. 1992) (stating that it would “def[y] reason” to interpret section 4(b)(4) as only precluding the 
creation of a private right of action based on the OSH Act). This Note argues in Part IV infra that such 
an interpretation of section 4(b)(4) is erroneous. See infra notes 190–217 and accompanying text. 
 125 See Todd Brilliant, Square Peg and Round Hole: Forcing OSHA Regulatory Violations into 
the Negligence Per Se Framework, 46 LAB. L.J. 228, 232 (1995) (arguing that section 4(b)(4) operates 
as a bar against deriving the standard of care from OSHA standards). 
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employers constituted “pure” negligence per se.126 Although some jurisdictions 
have adopted this position, most have not.127 In fact, the effect of an OSHA 
violation on a defendant’s liability in negligence cases varies significantly 
across both the federal and state appellate courts.128 This Part considers the 
competing approaches the state and federal courts have adopted concerning the 
role of OSHA violations in tort cases.129 Section A considers jurisdictions that 
treat OSHA violations as pure negligence per se.130 Section B considers juris-
dictions that treat OSHA violations as “some evidence” of negligence.131 Sec-
tion C considers jurisdictions that consider OSHA standards irrelevant to the 
applicable standard of care.132 Finally, Section D briefly considers the few ju-
risdictions yet to address the issue.133 
A. OSHA Violations as “Pure” Negligence Per Se 
Nine state high courts134 and three federal courts of appeals135 have held 
that OSHA violations, at least under some circumstances, constitute pure neg-
                                                                                                                           
 126 For an early example of this argument, ultimately endorsed by a state’s high court, see Knight 
v. Burns, Kirkley & Williams Construction Co., 331 So. 2d 651, 654–55 (Ala. 1976) (holding, in 
wrongful death action, that plaintiffs should have been given opportunity to present to a jury evidence 
of OSHA standards governing trench cave-in precautions). 
 127 See infra notes 134–189 and accompanying text. 
 128 See infra notes 134–189 and accompanying text. 
 129 See infra notes 134–189 and accompanying text. 
 130 See infra notes 134–149 and accompanying text. 
 131 See infra notes 150–162 and accompanying text. 
 132 See infra notes 163–168 and accompanying text. 
 133 See infra notes 169–189 and accompanying text. 
 134 See, e.g., Sanchez v. Galey, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 (Idaho 1986) (noting, somewhat dubiously, 
that negligence per se for OSHA violations when the plaintiff is the defendant’s employee is “[t]he 
decided majority and modern trend”). By my count, besides Idaho, the nine states whose high courts 
recognize, or at least suggest a favorable stance toward, pure negligence per se in cases of alleged 
OSHA violations are Alaska, California, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, Oklahoma, and Ten-
nessee. See Pagenkopf v. Chatham Elec., Inc., 165 P.3d 634, 647–49 (Alaska 2007) (assuming, with-
out deciding, that OSHA violations could constitute negligence per se); SeaBright Ins. Co. v. U.S. 
Airways, Inc., 258 P.3d 737, 745 (Cal. 2011); Koll v. Manatt’s Transp. Co., 253 N.W.2d 265, 270 
(Iowa 1977); Hargis v. Baize, 168 S.W.3d 36, 46 (Ky. 2005) (applying negligence per se to violation 
of state OSHA standards); Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 662 
(Minn. 2004); Trankel v. Dep’t of Military Affairs, 938 P.2d 614, 625 (Mont. 1997); Howard v. Zim-
mer, Inc., 299 P.3d 463, 468 (Okla. 2013) (holding that violation of a federal regulatory scheme, in-
cluding OSHA, will support a claim of negligence per se); Bellamy v. Fed. Express Corp., 749 
S.W.2d 31, 34–35 (Tenn. 1988). 
 135 See, e.g., Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 802–05 (6th Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing that violation of OSHA’s general duty clause is not negligence per se in claims brought by non-
employees, but violations of other specific duties may be). By my count, besides the Sixth Circuit, the 
First and Fifth Circuits also treat violations of OSHA as negligence per se, at least under certain cir-
cumstances. See Pratico v. Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 268 (1st Cir. 1985); Melerine v. 
Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d 706, 711–13 (5th Cir. 1981). Nonetheless, the First Circuit has, in 
a subsequent decision, suggested a less liberal application of negligence per se to OSHA violations. 
See Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co., 134 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998) (limiting negligence per se to FELA cases 
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ligence per se. These jurisdictions typically apply the analysis of the Second 
and Third Restatements, asking whether OSHA intended for the regulation to 
prevent the sort of harm alleged and protect the type of plaintiff involved.136 As 
such, several of the jurisdictions that have applied pure negligence per se to 
OSHA violations do not do so when the plaintiff is not an employee of the de-
fendant, concluding that the class of persons many OSHA standards are in-
tended to protect is limited to employees.137 Thus, many appellate courts have 
held that a defendant’s violation of OSHA is negligence per se when the de-
fendant is the plaintiff’s employer, but that such violation is merely “some evi-
dence” of negligence when the parties lack a genuine employment relation-
ship.138 
Although effectuating legislative intent appears to be the primary ra-
tionale courts employ when applying pure negligence per se principles to 
OSHA violations, this is not the only justification on which courts rely.139 For 
instance, in sharp contrast to Prosser and Keeton’s rationale for negligence per 
                                                                                                                           
and remarking that the Pratico decision is “of questionable validity”). At the same time, however, the 
Fifth Circuit has arguably broadened the potential application of the doctrine in some cases involving 
non-employees alleging violation of OSHA’s general duty clause. See Acosta v. Hensel Phelps Con-
str. Co., 909 F.3d 723, 742 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that OSHA may issue citations to controlling 
employers at multi-employer worksites pursuant to the general duty provision); see also supra notes 
104–107 and accompanying text (discussing OSHA’s general duty clause). 
 136 See, e.g., Melerine, 659 F.2d at 708 (holding that OSHA standards may furnish evidence of 
the standard of care, but only as between employers and employees); Sanchez, 733 P.2d at 1242 (re-
marking that OSHA violations easily fit within the framework of negligence per se). California, how-
ever, although still insisting that a given OSHA regulation be intended to protect the kind of plaintiff 
involved and prevent the sort of harm alleged, treats any violation as “presumptively” negligence per 
se. See SeaBright Ins. Co., 258 P.3d at 744 (holding that an employer’s violation of an OSHA provi-
sion at a multiemployer worksite that caused injury to another employer’s employee established prima 
facie negligence); see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 669 (Deering, LEXIS through 2020 Sess.) (“The fail-
ure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if . . . [h]e violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation 
of a public entity . . . .”). 
 137 See, e.g., Wiersgalla v. Garrett, 486 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Iowa 1992) (reversing trial court’s jury 
instruction, where the plaintiff was not the defendant’s employee, that a defendant’s OSHA violation 
constituted negligence per se). Additionally, the Supreme Court of Alaska has held that violations of 
OSHA and other federal regulations may be negligence per se, but not where the plaintiff was an 
independent contractor. See Pagenkopf, 165 P.3d at 647–49; State v. Johnson, 2 P.3d 56, 62–63 
(Alaska 2000) (endorsing negligence per se generally). 
 138 See Koll, 253 N.W.2d at 270 (holding, where a worker was killed by a truck that was operated 
by a company for whom the worker was not employed, that the truck operator’s violation of OSHA 
guidelines was only evidence of negligence). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
another court that has treated OSHA violations as pure negligence per se, takes this position even 
further, holding that admission of OSHA standards to determine the applicable standard of care when 
the parties lack an employment relationship would be unduly prejudicial to the defendant. See Mini-
chello v. U.S. Indus., Inc. 756 F.2d 26, 30 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 139 See, e.g., Sanchez, 733 P.2d at 1244 (“[W]e are persuaded that the intent of Congress in enact-
ing OSHA . . . can best be served by allowing instructions of negligence per se for violations of 
OSHA regulations.”); Trankel, 938 P.2d at 625.  
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se,140 the Supreme Court of Tennessee has pointed to another justification: 
consistency.141 In Bellamy v. Federal Express Corp., the court held that OSHA 
violations may create a basis of liability for negligence per se because of Ten-
nessee’s policy of “giving the maximum effect to” such safety statutes.142 The 
court expressly acknowledged that the application of negligence per se to 
OSHA violations was “on the outer periphery” of legislative intent.143 None-
theless, the court insisted that such an application was proper because it was 
“consistent with” the state’s general treatment of other statutory and regulatory 
violations.144 Not surprisingly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit, when applying Tennessee law, has employed this consistency-based 
rationale as well.145 
Some courts that apply pure negligence per se to OSHA violations do so 
only when the underlying action is brought pursuant to certain statutes.146 In 
Pratico v. Portland Terminal Co., for example, the First Circuit held, in an ac-
tion brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), that a plain-
tiff-employee allegedly injured due to his employer’s failure to use certain 
OSHA-required railroad equipment was entitled to a jury instruction on negli-
gence per se.147 The court made clear in a subsequent decision that Pratico’s 
holding is limited to claims brought under that federal statute and has no ap-
plicability to cases involving common law negligence.148 Interestingly, at least 
one other court has held just the opposite: that OSHA violations cannot be 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text (discussing Prosser and Keeton’s proffered 
rationale for negligence per se—namely, that the doctrine’s principal purpose is to give effect to the 
specific intent of the legislature and thus cannot exceed such scope); see also KEETON ET AL., supra 
note 66, at 230 (maintaining that a statutory violation “stamp[s] the defendant’s conduct as negli-
gence, with all of the effects of common law negligence, but with no greater effect” (emphasis add-
ed)). 
 141 See Bellamy, 749 S.W.2d at 34–35. 
 142 Id. The court cited its previous decision, Acuff v. Commissioner of the Tennessee Department 
of Labor, 554 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tenn. 1977), which held that state safety regulations could furnish the 
basis for negligence per se against an employer who would not have been liable under Tennessee’s 
common law tort principles. Bellamy, 749 S.W.2d at 34–35. 
 143 Bellamy, 749 S.W.2d at 34–35. 
 144 Id. at 34. But see King v. Danek Med., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429, 457–58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) 
(departing from the Bellamy approach where a statute set out “only administrative requirements,” 
rather than “substantive context”). 
 145 Teal, 728 F.2d at 804–05 (6th Cir. 1984) (interpreting the scope of intended beneficiaries of 
OSHA regulations “in a broad fashion” consistent with Tennessee case law). 
 146 See, e.g., Pratico, 783 F.2d at 268 (affirming negligence per se instruction). 
 147 Id.; see also Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2018) (enabling railroad 
workers not covered by workers’ compensation laws to recover for injuries sustained due to negli-
gence of federal employers). 
 148 Elliott, 134 F.3d at 4 (remarking that the Pratico decision is “of questionable validity”). 
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treated as negligence per se in FELA cases, but may be construed as such in 
common law negligence suits.149 
B. OSHA Violations as “Some” Evidence of Negligence 
In contrast to the courts that have taken the pure negligence per se ap-
proach, the vast majority of state high courts and federal appellate courts to 
consider the issue directly have held that OSHA violations are just some evi-
dence of negligence in tort cases.150 Courts often justify their rejection of pure 
negligence per se principles to OSHA violations on the grounds that doing so 
is contrary to the intent of Congress in enacting the OSH Act.151 For example, 
in Toll Brothers v. Considine, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that, in or-
der to serve as the basis for negligence per se, administrative regulations must 
                                                                                                                           
 149 Hebel v. Conrail, Inc., 475 N.E.2d 652, 657, 658 (Ind. 1985) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) 
(1982)); see also Blocher v. DeBartolo Props. Mgmt., 760 N.E.2d 229, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) 
(“While Hebel was decided within the context of a FELA action, we find its rationale equally applica-
ble to the present action.”). 
 150 See, e.g., C & M Builders, LLC v. Strub, 22 A.3d 867, 875 (Md. 2011) (holding that the ad-
missibility of both state and federal OSHA standards to show any evidence of negligence depends 
upon whether the alleged OSHA-violator owed an employer’s duty to the plaintiff). According to 
reported state case law, in addition to Maryland, twenty state high courts that have directly considered 
the issue have held that OSHA violations constitute evidence, albeit not conclusive evidence, of a 
party’s negligence. See Smith v. Int’l Paper Co., 656 So. 2d 355, 358 (Ala. 1995); Dunn v. Brimer, 
537 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Ark. 1976); Scott v. Matlack, Inc., 39 P.3d 1160, 1166–67, 1170 (Colo. 2002); 
Mazurek v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 930 A.2d 682, 691 (Conn. 2007); Toll Bros. v. Considine, 706 A.2d 
493, 494 (Del. 1998); Rapoza v. Willocks Constr. Corp, No. 22052, 2004 WL 27460, at *15 n.38 
(Haw. Jan. 2, 2004); Schultz v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R. Corp., 775 N.E.2d 964, 986 (Ill. 2002); 
Balagna v. Shawnee Cty., 668 P.2d 157, 165–66 (Kan. 1983); Giddens v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 29 
S.W.3d 813, 821 (Mo. 2000); Orduna v. Total Constr. Servs., 713 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Neb. 2006); 
Alloway v. Bradlees, Inc., 723 A.2d 960, 967 (N.J. 1999); Valdez v. Cillessen & Son, Inc., 734 P.2d 
1258, 1261 (N.M. 1987); Hernandez v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ohio 1995); 
Duncan v. Pennington Cty. Hous. Auth., 283 N.W.2d 546, 548–49 (S.D. 1979); Daugherty v. S. Pac. 
Transp. Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989) (allowing for the OSHA standard to serve as evidence of 
the standard of care, but declining to decide whether OSHA violations can constitute negligence per 
se); Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 1999 UT 55, ¶ 21, 985 P.2d 892, 897; Marzec-Gerrior v. D.C.P. 
Indus., 674 A.2d 1248, 1249 (Vt. 1995); Adkins v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 750 P.2d 1257, 1266 
(Wash. 1988); Poulos v. HPC, Inc., 765 P.2d 364, 366 (Wyo. 1988). Note that Florida is included in 
this tally; although its high court has not addressed the issue directly, its current civil jury instructions 
provide that OSHA violations constitute some evidence of a party’s negligence. In re Standard Jury 
Instructions in Civil Cases—Report No. 09-01 (Reorganization of the Civil Jury Instructions), 35 
So. 3d 666, 687–88 (Fla. 2010). Additionally, four of the federal appeals courts that have directly 
considered the issue have held the same. See Jones v. Spentonbush-Red Star Co., 155 F.3d 587, 595 
(2d Cir. 1998); Robertson v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 32 F.3d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1994); Ries v. Nat’l 
R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 1162 (3d Cir. 1992); Albrecht v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 808 
F.2d 329, 332–33 (4th Cir. 1987).  
 151 See, e.g., Scott, 39 P.3d at 1166–67, 1170 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2000)) (holding that 
the OSH Act rules out the application of pure negligence per se principles in tort actions involving an 
alleged OSHA violation). 
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be promulgated pursuant to state legislative directive.152 Thus, because Dela-
ware’s state legislature had never formally adopted federal OSHA standards, 
the court held that violations of such standards could not be negligence per 
se.153 According to the court, Congress itself recognized this limitation when it 
stated in the OSH Act that OSHA regulations shall not operate to “enlarge state 
common law rights, duties or liabilities.”154 Many other “some evidence” ju-
risdictions have justified their approach by citing this same congressional dis-
claimer as well.155 Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that several of these 
jurisdictions endorse negligence per se for other regulatory violations but treat 
OSHA violations—often not formally adopted by state legislatures—
differently.156 
Although the “some evidence” jurisdictions agree that OSHA violations 
are sometimes admissible as evidence of the standard of care, and that pure 
negligence per se principles are inappropriate in OSHA litigation, they disa-
gree on other points.157 For example, a few of these jurisdictions have express-
ly held that OSHA standards are only admissible in suits between employees 
and employers,158 whereas several others have not been so restrictive.159 An-
                                                                                                                           
 152 706 A.2d at 494 (holding that trial court’s jury instruction that OSHA violations constituted 
negligence per se was reversible error). 
 153 Id. As discussed supra at notes 108–116, although the OSH Act permits states to adopt their 
own safety standards in place of OSHA regulations if such standards are at least as effective as federal 
ones, the United States Supreme Court held in Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n that 
OSHA regulations preempt state safety standards if a state does not seek federal approval of its state-
promulgated standards. See 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992). Thus, although Delaware had promulgated its 
own standards in place of OSHA regulations, it failed to seek federal approval by the time Toll Broth-
ers was decided. See 706 A.2d at 497. As such, its state safety standards were preempted. Id. 
 154 See Toll Bros., 706 A.2d at 494, 496, 497 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1994)). 
 155 See, e.g., Scott, 39 P.3d at 1166–67, 1170 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2000)) (holding that 
Congress intended neither for OSHA violations to be negligence per se, nor for such standards to be 
totally excluded as evidence in negligence litigation); Hernandez, 649 N.E.2d at 1216, 1217 (citing 29 
U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1994)) (holding that the OSH Act precludes the application of pure negligence per 
se to OSHA violations). But see Tallman, 985 P.2d at 897 (“[D]espite []OSHA’s provision prohibiting 
its use to affect common-law rights, duties, or liabilities of employers, the factfinder may look to . . . 
OSHA for evidence of industry standards in certain circumstances.”). 
 156 Compare Mazurek, 930 A.2d at 691 (rejecting negligence per se instruction where defendant 
had allegedly violated OSHA standards), with Gore v. People’s Sav. Bank, 665 A.2d 1341, 1348, 
1349–50 (Conn. 1995) (“[U]nder general principles of [Connecticut] tort law, a requirement imposed 
by statute may establish the applicable standard of care to be applied . . . .”). 
 157 See infra notes 158–162 and accompanying text. 
 158 See, e.g., Melerine, 659 F.2d at 708 (holding that OSHA standards only provide relevant evi-
dence of the duty an employer owes to its immediate employees); Taira v. Oahu Sugar Co., 616 P.2d 
1026, 1030 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980) (finding OSHA standards “irrelevant and properly excluded” in 
action between parties not in an employment relationship); see also Banovetz v. King, 66 F. Supp. 2d 
1076, 1081 (D. Minn. 1999) (noting that OSHA does not define the duties of care between third-
parties and employers). 
 159 Reed v. Malone’s Mech., Inc., 765 F.3d 900, 905 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that OSHA stand-
ards may provide evidence of the applicable standard of care owed a plaintiff even if that plaintiff is a 
mere contractor of the defendant); Dunn, 527 S.W.2d at 166 (same); Orduna, 713 N.W.2d at 479 
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other difference in approach among the “some evidence” jurisdictions is the 
evidentiary weight afforded OSHA violations.160 At least one state high court 
has held that OSHA violations can provide “substantial evidence”161 of negli-
gence, but most jurisdictions do not specify the evidentiary weight afforded to 
OSHA violations, instead reserving this determination for the jury.162 
C. OSHA Violations as Irrelevant to a Finding of Negligence 
Although more states adopted the approach in the past,163 today only one 
state high court holds that OSHA standards are categorically inadmissible in 
negligence cases, and thus, that violations of OSHA have no bearing on a par-
ty’s breach of duty.164 In Sumrall v. Mississippi Power Co., the Supreme Court 
of Mississippi considered whether, in a suit brought by a laborer allegedly in-
jured while digging a trench for the defendant’s coal burning operation, evi-
dence regarding the defendant’s compliance with OSHA standards was admis-
sible.165 The court affirmed a finding in favor of the defendant, holding that 
evidence of OSHA violations may not be admitted to show a party’s negli-
gence.166 The basis for the court’s decision was its view that federal safety 
standards are admissible as evidence of negligence only when the state legisla-
ture gives compulsory force to such standards, which the Mississippi Legisla-
                                                                                                                           
(same); Ball v. Melsur Corp., 633 A.2d 705, 712 (Vt. 1993) (declining to limit evidence of the stand-
ard of care established by OSHA standards to the “employer-employee” relationship). 
 160 See ROTHSTEIN , supra note 14, § 21:13. 
 161 Smith, 656 So. 2d at 358 (holding that documentary evidence of OSHA violations compiled in 
an OSHA representative’s report constituted significant evidence that defendant breached its duty to 
provide a safe place to work). 
 162 See, e.g., Toll Bros., 706 A.2d at 498 (holding that OSHA standards may legitimately contrib-
ute to “the total mix of what is reasonable conduct” in the mind of the jury); Kollmer v. Slater Elec., 
Inc., 504 N.Y.S.2d 690, 692 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that “relevant OSHA regulations may be ad-
mitted into evidence and it will be for the jury to determine . . . whether the violation constituted some 
evidence of negligence of the employer”). 
 163 Compare Strouse v. Webcor Constr., L.P., 246 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 431, 432 (Ct. App. 2019) 
(quoting Elsner v. Uveges, 102 P.3d 915, 917 (Cal. 2004)) (affirming the trial court’s negligence per 
se instruction on the basis that California’s state OSHA provisions “are to be treated like any other 
statute or regulation” for negligence per se purposes), with CAL. LAB. CODE § 6304.5 (Deering 1971) 
(barring courts in negligence actions from treating OSHA standards as admissible as to a party’s neg-
ligence). California Labor Code § 6304.5 was later amended in 1999, when the state legislature re-
stored the prior treatment of OSHA violations as “presumptive” negligence. 1999 Cal. Stat. 4337. 
 164 Sumrall v. Miss. Power Co., 693 So. 2d 359, 367 (Miss. 1997).  
 165 Id. Specifically, the injured party’s role as it related to the coal burning operation was to repair 
the “discharge structure” that connected the two “pond[s]” in which the defendant discarded thou-
sands of pounds of “fly ash,” the powdery residue that forms from the coal burning process. See id. at 
361–62. This required digging a trench thirty feet deep to recover and replace the discharge structure 
that was lying beneath several thousand pounds of ash. See id. 
 166 Id. at 367 (rejecting the admissibility of OSHA standards to impeach witness who declared 
that work on the discharge structure project complied with all state and federal safety standards). 
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ture had expressly declined to do.167 Although Sumrall has not been directly 
overruled, the scope of its holding is somewhat unclear, as the Mississippi Su-
preme Court has subsequently held that OSHA standards, although irrelevant 
to the question of negligence, may be admitted for other “limited purposes.”168 
D. Jurisdictions Yet to Decide 
Over a dozen state high courts and several federal appellate courts have 
not yet directly addressed the role of OSHA violations in negligence cases.169 
Nonetheless, the approach such jurisdictions would likely adopt may be dis-
cerned from analogous cases involving other administrative safety standards, 
as well as from the decisions of intermediate appellate courts.170 
Most yet-undecided jurisdictions would likely adopt the “some evidence” 
approach to OSHA violations.171 For example, although Arizona’s highest 
court has not addressed the issue,172 its lower appellate court has held that 
OSHA standards may establish the standard of care and that their violation 
may be evidence of negligence for the jury to consider—even when OSHA 
standards are not binding on a particular defendant.173 The intermediate appel-
                                                                                                                           
 167 Id. Notably, as discussed in the preceding Section, this is the same logic employed by many of 
the “some evidence” jurisdictions that interpret section 4(b)(4) of the OSH Act as a prohibition merely 
on pure negligence per se. See, e.g., Toll Bros., 706 A.2d at 498 (permitting OSHA violations to be 
admissible as evidence of a defendant’s negligence); supra notes 152–156 and accompanying text. 
 168 See Accu-Fab & Constr., Inc. v. Ladner, 778 So. 2d 766, 771 (Miss. 2001) (“In the present 
case, the OSHA regulations were not admitted to show negligence on the part of [defendants], but 
rather they were admitted only to be used as a measure of reasonable care consistent with industry 
standards.”), overruled on other grounds by Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tackett, 841 So. 2d 1107, 1115 
(Miss. 2003) (overruling Ladner insofar as it held that immune parties may not be assessed fault, as 
opposed to liability, under state damages statute). 
 169 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 21:13. These include the state courts of last resort of Arizo-
na, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nevada, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia and the United States Courts 
of Appeals for the Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, District of Columbia, and Federal Circuits. Alt-
hough a few such courts have expressly acknowledged their indecision on the matter, see, e.g., Mail-
hot v. C & R Constr. Co., 514 A.2d 1255, 1256 (N.H. 1986) (declining to address the role of OSHA 
violations in negligence actions); Praus ex rel. Praus v. Mack, 2001 ND 80, ¶ 35, 626 N.W.2d 239, 
250; Halterman v. Radisson Hotel Corp., 523 S.E.2d 823, 825 n.1 (Va. 2000) (declining to articulate 
proper relationship, under Virginia law, between OSHA violations and negligence per se), most have 
simply left the matter unaddressed entirely. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 21:13. 
 170 See infra notes 171–189 and accompanying text. 
 171 See infra notes 172–189 and accompanying text. 
 172 Wendland v. AdobeAir, Inc., 221 P.3d 390, 394 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (“[W]hether OSHA 
standards may be presented to a jury as some evidence of a standard of care is a matter of first impres-
sion in Arizona.”). 
 173 See id. at 395–96. But see Hallmark v. Allied Prods. Corp., 646 P.2d 319, 325 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1982) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit OSHA regulations as 
evidence of standard of care). 
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late courts of Louisiana,174 Massachusetts,175 Michigan,176 New York,177 North 
Carolina,178 and Pennsylvania179 have all held the same, that is, that OSHA 
standards, although not a basis for negligence per se, are relevant evidence of 
the standard of care.180 In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has 
held that a violation of a “safety statute” is some evidence of negligence,181 
and the high courts of North Dakota182 and West Virginia183 maintain similar 
positions. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that such jurisdictions would adopt 
the “some evidence” approach to OSHA violations.184 
On the other hand, a few state courts of last resort could quite possibly adopt 
an approach to OSHA violations akin to pure negligence per se.185 The intermedi-
                                                                                                                           
 174 Gatlin v. Entergy Corp., 2004-0034, 2004-1368 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/4/05); 904 So. 2d 31, 35 
(permitting the defendant, to show contributory negligence, to introduce OSHA standards that the 
plaintiff was required to follow). 
 175 Eagan v. Marr Scaffolding Co., 442 N.E.2d 743, 745 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (allowing the 
plaintiff, in an action arising out of a scaffolding collapse, to introduce expert testimony regarding 
OSHA standards as evidence of the applicable standard of care). But see Almeida v. Pinto, 115 N.E.3d 
574, 579–80 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018) (holding that the OSHA standards were inadmissible as evidence 
of a defendant’s negligence when the defendant was a homeowner and the plaintiff was an independ-
ent contractor hired to work at the defendant’s home). 
 176 Sanderson v. Cahill Constr. Co., No. 294939, 2011 Mich. App. LEXIS 611, at *10–11 (Apr. 5, 
2011) (holding that violations of federal OSHA standards and of Michigan’s state-promulgated OSHA 
standards constitute evidence of negligence on the basis that the purposes of such standards “overlap 
with those underlying tort law”). 
 177 Kollmer, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 692 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that “relevant OSHA regulations 
may be admitted into evidence and it will be for the jury to determine whether . . . the violation consti-
tuted some evidence of negligence”). 
 178 Cowan v. Laughridge Constr. Co., 291 S.E.2d 287, 290 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that 
OSHA standards constitute evidence of construction industry custom, which was relevant to a jury’s 
assessment of whether the defendant acted reasonably). 
 179 Wood v. Smith, 495 A.2d 601, 603 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (concluding that the trial court’s jury 
instruction was insufficient because it failed to indicate that the defendants’ conduct should be meas-
ured in light of existing OSHA standards). 
 180 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 21:13. At least one other intermediate appellate court has 
expressly indicated that OSHA violations cannot serve as the basis for negligence per se, without 
speaking to whether OSHA violations are nonetheless relevant to the question of negligence. See Taft 
v. Derricks, 2000 WI App 103, 235 Wis.2d 22, ¶ 22, 613 N.W.2d 190, 196 (interpreting the OSHA 
general duty provision and concluding that the defendant was not an employer bound by OSHA). 
 181 Town of Stonington v. Galilean Gospel Temple, 1999 ME 2, ¶ 10, 722 A.2d 1269, 1272 (af-
firming trial court’s “evidence of negligence” instruction with respect to the defendant’s violation of a 
noise control ordinance, which was akin to a “safety statute”). 
 182 Praus, 626 N.W.2d at 250 (N.D. 2001) (affirming the trial court’s jury instruction that stated 
that OSHA standards could be considered in determining the applicable standard of care but could not 
constitute negligence per se). 
 183 Vandergrift v. Johnson, 206 S.E.2d 515, 517 (W. Va. 1974) (holding that violations of statutes 
and regulations cannot serve as the basis for negligence per se). 
 184 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 14, § 21:13. 
 185 See, e.g., Halterman, 523 S.E.2d at 825 n.1 (Va. 2000) (assuming, without deciding, that the 
violation of an OSHA regulation is negligence per se). 
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ate appellate courts of Georgia186 and South Carolina,187 for instance, have held 
that OSHA violations constitute negligence per se when the plaintiff is a worker 
that the standard was intended to protect.188 Likewise, Nevada’s Supreme Court, 
although it has not yet addressed the role of OSHA violations in negligence cases, 
might be willing to adopt the pure negligence per se position, as it has occasional-
ly taken a more liberal approach to the doctrine in other contexts.189 
IV. TREATING OSHA VIOLATIONS AS NEGLIGENCE PER SE IS LEGITIMATE 
Upon surveying the various positions adopted by the state and federal 
courts on the proper role of OSHA standards in negligence cases, one conclu-
sion is clear: relatively few courts accept that OSHA violations ought to consti-
tute negligence per se, and even those that do will often only apply the doctrine 
under limited circumstances.190 But why is this so? If the decision to derive the 
applicable standard of care from a statute or regulation is “purely a judicial one 
. . . for the court to make,”191 then why should so many courts conclude that 
they are powerless to treat OSHA violations as negligence per se?192 This Part 
                                                                                                                           
 186 Kull v. Six Flags Over Ga. II, L.P., 592 S.E.2d 143, 144–46 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that 
a plaintiff laborer who failed to “deenergize” equipment on which he was working, in violation of an 
OSHA requirement, was contributorily negligent per se and thus barred from recovery). 
 187 Holst v. S.C. State Port Auth., No. 2011-UP-198, 2011 WL 11734309, at *10 (S.C. Ct. App. 
May 3, 2011) (holding that OSHA standards could serve as evidence of contributory negligence where 
there was evidence that decedent was aware of such standards). 
 188 But see Bryant v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 536 S.E.2d 380, 384 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that 
OSHA regulations establish a standard of care only between parties in a formal employment relation-
ship). 
 189 Vega v. E. Courtyard Assocs., 24 P.3d 219, 222 (Nev. 2001) (holding that violation of build-
ing code ordinance may furnish the basis for negligence per se). But see Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 221 P.3d 1276, 1283–84 (Nev. 2009) (refusing to apply negligence per se where the defendant 
pharmacy allegedly violated statutes concerning drug dispensation and where a driver under the influ-
ence of prescription drugs injured the plaintiffs, as such statutes were not intended to protect the gen-
eral public from injury from drug-induced drivers). 
 190 See, e.g., Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co., 134 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998) (limiting the application of 
negligence per se to OSHA-related cases brought under FELA); Koll v. Manatt’s Transp. Co., 253 
N.W.2d 265, 270 (Iowa 1977) (limiting the application of negligence per se to OSHA-related cases 
between parties in a formal employment relationship). 
 191 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also Zeni v. 
Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270, 280 (Mich. 1976) (noting that courts are free in their discretion to adopt 
or not adopt legislative standards as the applicable duty of care at tort). 
 192 See, e.g., Minichello v. U.S. Indus., Inc. 756 F.2d 26, 29 (6th Cir. 1985) (“To use OSHA regu-
lations to establish whether a product is unreasonably dangerous is . . . improper. If knowledge of the 
regulations leads the trier of fact to find a product defective, the effect is to impermissibly alter the 
civil standard of liability.” (emphasis added)). Certainly, courts may recognize their ability to derive 
the applicable standard of care wholly from an OSHA standard that a party is alleged to have violated, 
and simply elect not to do so. See, e.g., Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 1999 UT 55, ¶ 21, 985 P.2d 892, 
897 (“In determining the appropriate standard of conduct, the Restatement permits courts to adopt a 
standard from legislative enactments or administrative regulations which do not themselves purport to 
establish the standard.” (emphasis added)). Such elections are reasonable, to be sure. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. d (describing when it is appropriate for a court to adopt a stand-
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submits that the reason is primarily due to both a misunderstanding of negli-
gence per se and a misapplication of the OSH Act, and that, contrary to the 
position of such courts, treating OSHA violations as negligence per se is con-
sistent with both the OSH Act and the doctrine of negligence per se itself.193 
As the preceding Part discusses, one of the primary justifications courts 
rely upon when holding that OSHA violations are not negligence per se is the 
OSH Act’s “savings clause,” which provides that the Act may not “enlarge,” 
“diminish,” or even “affect,” the duties and liabilities of employers under state 
law.194 To apply negligence per se to violations of OSHA standards, the think-
ing goes, would be to impermissibly “enlarge,” or at least “affect,” the liability 
of employers under state tort law.195 This is so, apparently, because the stand-
ard of care that OSHA mandates is often more onerous than the ordinarily ap-
plicable one, the “reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circum-
stances” standard.196 Therefore, the argument concludes, negligence per se is 
incompatible with both the letter and intent of the OSH Act.197 
This argument is flawed for two reasons.198 First, to interpret the OSH 
Act’s section 4(b)(4) “disclaimer” as a bar against negligence per se in the case 
of OSHA violations is to misunderstand the discretionary nature of negligence 
per se; in other words, it is to presume that when courts treat a particular 
OSHA standard alleged to have been violated as commensurate with the appli-
cable standard of care, such courts do so under compulsion.199 But this is not, 
or at least, need not, be so.200 From its earliest application in American law, 
                                                                                                                           
ard of conduct for a regulation). In many cases, however, particularly when courts cite the OSH Act’s 
“savings clause” or “disclaimer” discussed supra at notes 117–125 and 152–156 and accompanying 
text, the analysis suggests a perceived powerlessness to apply negligence per se rather than a delibera-
tive declination. See Minichello, 756 F.2d at 29. 
 193 See infra notes 194–217 and accompanying text. 
 194 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2018); see supra notes 152–156 and accompanying text (discussing the 
influence of section 4(b)(4) on the “some evidence” jurisdictions). 
 195 See Ries v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 1162 (3d Cir. 1992) (“If a violation of 
an OSHA regulation could constitute negligence per se . . . it would be almost axiomatic that the ef-
fect would be to ‘enlarge or diminish or affect’ the statutory duty or liability of the employer.” (citing 
29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4))). 
 196 See Brilliant, supra note 125, at 231–33 (arguing that the purpose of the OSH Act was to cre-
ate a heightened standard of care beyond that of regular tort liability); see also supra notes 2–4 and 
accompanying text (discussing “reasonable person” standard). 
 197 See Brilliant, supra note 125, 232 (noting the “prophylactic” nature of OSHA standards (quot-
ing Whirpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12 (1980))). 
 198 See infra notes 199–209 and accompanying text. For a compelling scholarly argument to the 
contrary, see Brilliant, supra note 125, at 231–34 (arguing that, given OSHA’s heightened standard of 
care, treating an OSHA regulatory violation as negligence per se would be barred by section 4(b)(4) of 
the OSH Act). 
 199 See Kritchevsky, supra note 45, at 126 (arguing that treating violations of federal statutes and 
regulations as negligence per se enables Congress to supersede the will of state legislatures). 
 200 See id. at 123–28. Professor Kritchevsky characterizes a state’s use of negligence per se as an 
act of deference to the legislature. Id. To be sure, deference to legislative judgments forms part of the 
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negligence per se has been characterized, above all, by judicial discretion.201 
The Restatements, for their part, did not merely acknowledge the discretionary 
nature of negligence per se—they buttressed it, emphasizing that a court’s der-
ivation of the standard of care from a statute or administrative regulation is a 
choice entirely the court’s own.202 For this reason, courts have long acknowl-
edged that they are “free, in making [their] own judicial rules, to adopt and 
apply . . . the standard of conduct” that the legislature or other regulatory body 
prescribed.203 The OSH Act’s savings clause does not function to rob the 
courts of this power in tort actions involving OSHA violations.204 
Second, to hold that treating OSHA violations as negligence per se im-
permissibly “affects” state tort policy implies, on the principle that omne majus 
continet in se minus,205 that any admission of OSHA standards is improper.206 
In other words, because any and all evidence of negligence necessarily “af-
fect[s] . . . the liabilities of employers,” it would seem to follow that treating 
OSHA violations even as some evidence of negligence is inconsistent with the 
OSH Act.207 Thus, when courts hold, on the one hand, that OSHA violations 
are relevant evidence for assessing a defendant’s negligence, but on the other, 
that such violations cannot render that defendant negligent per se because the 
                                                                                                                           
traditional rationale for negligence per se. See supra notes 58–75 and accompanying text (discussing 
influence of Thayer and Prosser and Keeton on development of rationale for negligence per se). At the 
same time, however, such deference need not be reflexive, which is apparently the only way that Pro-
fessor Kritchevsky can conceive a court applying negligence per se when federal statutes and regula-
tions are at issue. See Kritchevsky, supra note 45, at 128 (“Courts should recognize that the doctrine 
of negligence per se alters the contours of state tort suits and refuse to give violations of federal law 
negligence-per-se effect.”). Contrary to Professor Kritchevsky’s account, a court’s decision to derive 
the applicable standard of reasonable conduct from a legislative or administrative enactment is, 
properly understood, a deliberative, not a reflexive, one; it is determination based ultimately upon the 
court’s own judgment, not the legislature’s, as to the suitability of a particular enactment’s declared 
standard of conduct for the circumstances of a given case. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 286 cmt. d. 
 201 See Rong Yao Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Rest., Inc., 534 A.2d 1268, 1274 (D.C. 1987) (discussing 
negligence per se) (“Defining the contours of common law liability, including the duty that may have 
been breached in a negligence case, is a task traditionally within the purview of the judicial branch.”). 
 202 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. d. 
 203 See, e.g., Tallman, 1999 UT 55, ¶ 21 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. 
d) (“In determining the appropriate standard of conduct, the Restatement permits courts to adopt a 
standard from legislative enactments or administrative regulations which do not themselves purport to 
establish the standard.”). 
 204 See Sanchez v. Galey, 733 P.2d 1234, 1243–44 (Idaho 1986) (interpreting section 4(b)(4) as 
merely precluding a private right of action based on an OSHA violation alone). 
 205 HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, CLASSIFIED AND ILLUSTRATED 
173 (5th ed. 1874). That is, that the greater includes the less. See Michael Herz, Justice Byron White 
and the Argument that the Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227, 227, 280 (observing 
that the argument that the greater includes the less is often valid, notwithstanding that it is also “slip-
pery”). 
 206 See Brilliant, supra note 125, at 232 n.30 (posing that section 4(b)(4) of the OSH Act may 
suggest the total inadmissibility of OSHA standards in tort cases). 
 207 See id.; 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4). 
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OSH Act forbids OSHA violations from influencing state tort law, they occupy 
a logically incoherent and legally indefensible middle ground.208 Astonish-
ingly, however, as Part III of this Note makes clear, the majority of courts that 
have directly addressed the relationship between OSHA violations and negli-
gence appear to inhabit this turbid legal realm.209 
Contrary to the view of many courts, treating OSHA violations as pure 
negligence per se would only run afoul of section 4(b)(4) if a court concluded 
that it had no choice other than to apply the doctrine.210 If courts were in fact 
restricted in this way, federally promulgated regulations would become sub-
sumed into state tort law without the state court having any say.211 Indeed, if 
this were so, litigants could force courts to incorporate new standards of care 
into the state common law simply by filing a negligence action upon their em-
ployer’s receipt of a citation from OSHA.212 Certainly, this state of affairs 
would impermissibly enable federally promulgated standards to alter state tort 
law to the detriment of employers, which, as section 4(b)(4) makes clear, is 
violative of the OSH Act.213 
But again, that is not how negligence per se works.214 Properly under-
stood, a court’s application of negligence per se to violations of OSHA reflects 
that court’s own deliberative judgment—not the judgment of a legislature or 
administrative body—as to how a defendant was obliged to conduct them-
selves.215 Then-Judge Cardozo’s specific choice of words in what would be-
come the most cited passage on negligence per se by an American court per-
haps best illustrates the discretionary nature of applying negligence per se: “We 
think the unexcused omission of the statutory [requirements] is . . . negligence 
                                                                                                                           
 208 See Ries v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 1168 (3d Cir. 1992) (Nygaard, J., 
concurring) (maintaining that any admission of OSHA standards impermissibly affects the liability 
analysis in contravention of section 4(b)(4), as this is the very reason plaintiffs would seek to admit 
such standards in the first place). 
 209 See supra notes 150–162 and accompanying text (stating that approximately twenty-one state 
courts of last resort and four federal appeals courts have found that OSHA violations are not negli-
gence per se, but are nonetheless relevant to the issue of breach of duty). 
 210 See Pratico v. Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 265 (1st Cir. 1985) (concluding that sec-
tion 4(b)(4) does not bar treating OSHA violations as negligence per se because negligence per se 
does “not create any new ‘rights, duties or liabilities’” under state tort law); Sanchez v. Galey, 733 
P.2d 1234, 1243–44 (Idaho 1986) (applying negligence per se to OSHA violation in spite of section 
4(b)(4)). 
 211 See Kritchevsky, supra note 45, at 128. Again, this is apparently how Professor Kritchevsky 
believes courts behave at present. See id. 
 212 See id. 
 213 See 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4). 
 214 See supra notes 199–204 and accompanying text. 
 215 See Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (1920), superseded by statute, 1975 N.Y. Laws 94, 
as recognized in Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39, 41 (N.Y. 1984); see also Pratico, 783 F.2d at 265; 
Sanchez, 733 P.2d at 1243–44. 
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in itself.”216 As such, courts err when they conclude that the OSH Act places 
any bar on the application of negligence per se to OSHA violations.217 
CONCLUSION 
Negligence per se, despite its deep roots in American law, remains a divi-
sive doctrine among courts, particularly in OSHA-related litigation. Although 
many courts are of the view that treating a party’s violation of federally prom-
ulgated OSHA standards as negligence per se is contrary to OSHA itself, this is 
not so. Indeed, negligence per se is, and has been since its earliest days, inex-
tricably linked to judicial discretion. Whether to adopt a legislative or adminis-
trative enactment, federal or otherwise, as the applicable standard of care in a 
negligence case is “purely” a judicial determination.218 OSHA does not dimin-
ish this discretion. Choosing to derive the applicable standard of care in tort 
from an OSHA promulgation may not always be the best course of action, to 
be sure. The prudence of such a decision will likely depend upon the circum-
stances of the case at hand, the relationship between the parties, and the partic-
ular OSHA standard at issue. That such a decision remains solely one for the 
court to make, however, ought to be conceded. 
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 216 Martin, 126 N.E. at 815 (emphasis added). 
 217 See id. 
 218 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
